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ERGODICITY CONDITIONS FOR ZERO-SUM GAMES
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91128 Palaiseau Cedex, France
Abstract. A basic question for zero-sum repeated games consists in determin-
ing whether the mean payoff per time unit is independent of the initial state.
In the special case of “zero-player” games, i.e., of Markov chains equipped with
additive functionals, the answer is provided by the mean ergodic theorem. We
generalize this result to repeated games. We show that the mean payoff is inde-
pendent of the initial state for all state-dependent perturbations of the rewards
if and only if an ergodicity condition is verified. The latter is characterized by
the uniqueness modulo constants of nonlinear harmonic functions (fixed points
of the recession function associated to the Shapley operator), or, in the special
case of stochastic games with finite action spaces and perfect information, by a
reachability condition involving conjugate subsets of states in directed hyper-
graphs. We show that the ergodicity condition for games only depends on the
support of the transition probability, and that it can be checked in polynomial
time when the number of states is fixed.
1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation and related work. The ergodicity of dynamical systems or of
stochastic processes can be considered in several guises. In the elementary case of
a discrete time Markov chain (ξk)k>0 with finite state space S = [n] := {1, . . . , n},
ergodicity can be classically defined by any of the equivalent properties listed in the
following theorem. Note that these properties only involve the transition probability
matrix P = (P (ξk+1 = j | ξk = i))i,j=1,...,n ∈ R
n×n.
Theorem 1.1. Let P ∈ Rn×n be a stochastic matrix. The following properties are
equivalent.
(i) Every vector η ∈ Rn such that Pη = η is constant;
(ii) For every vector g ∈ Rn, the Cesaro limit
lim
k→∞
k−1(g + Pg + · · ·+ P k−1g)(1)
is a constant vector;
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(iii) For every vector g ∈ Rn, the ergodic equation
g + Pu = λ1+ u ,(2)
where 1 denotes the unit vector of Rn, admits a solution (λ, u) ∈ R× Rn;
(iv) The directed graph associated to the matrix P has only one final class;
(v) The matrix P has only one invariant measure, that is a stochastic row
vector m ∈ R1×n such that mP = m.
Recall that a matrix P = (Pij) ∈ R
n×n (resp. a row vector m = (mj) ∈ R
1×n) is
said to be stochastic when all its entries are nonnegative and each of its rows sums
to one, meaning that Pij > 0 and
∑n
ℓ=1 Piℓ = 1 for all i, j ∈ [n] (resp. mj > 0 for
all j ∈ [n] and
∑n
j=1mj = 1). The directed graph associated with P is composed
of the nodes 1, . . . , n and of the arcs (i, j), i ∈ [n], j ∈ [n] with Pij > 0. A class
of the matrix P is a maximal set of nodes such that every two nodes of the set
are connected by a directed path. A class is said to be final if every path starting
from a node of this class remains in this class. We refer the reader to [7, Chap. 8]
for details. The previous properties are well known, in particular, the equivalence
between (iv) and (v) follows from Theorem 3.23 in the latter reference, whereas the
remaining equivalences follow from Theorem 6.1 in [30].
The scalar λ in the ergodic equation (2), known as the ergodic constant, gives
the coordinates of the constant vector (1).
The term ergodicity is generally used to refer to the uniqueness of the invariant
measure, and so, following Kemeny and Snell [17], we call ergodic a Markov chain
with the above properties of its transition probability matrix. We warn the reader
that some authors use the word “ergodic” in a stronger sense, requiring, for a finite
Markov chain, the matrix P to be irreducible and aperiodic.
In this paper, we extend the notion of ergodicity to zero-sum two-player repeated
games with finite state space S = [n]. We refer the reader to Section 2 for the
detailed definition of these games. For the moment, we shall only need to know
that the game in horizon k with initial state i has a value, denoted by vki ∈ R,
and that the value vector vk = (vki )16i6n is determined from the Shapley operator
T = T (r, P ). The latter is the map Rn → Rn given by
(3) [T (r, P )(x)]i = inf
a∈Ai
sup
b∈Bi
(rabi + P
ab
i x) ,
for all x = (xi)i∈S . Here, Ai denotes the set of actions of player MIN in state
i ∈ S, Bi denotes the set of actions of player MAX in the same state, r
ab
i denotes an
running payment made by player MIN to player MAX in state i when the actions
a, b are chosen, and P abi is a row vector such that (P
ab
i )j represents the probability
of transition from state i to state j, when the actions a, b are chosen. It is known
that the value vector vk = (vki )i∈S can be computed recursively by
vk = T (vk−1), v0 = 0 .
Here, we will be interested in the mean payoff vector
χ(T ) := lim
k→+∞
vk
k
= lim
k→+∞
T k(0)
k
,
where T k := T ◦ · · · ◦ T denotes the kth iterate of T , so that [χ(T )]i represents the
mean payoff per time unit of the game starting from state i, as the horizon tends
to infinity.
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The question of the existence of the mean payoff vector has been studied by
several authors, including Bewley, Kohlberg, Mertens, Neyman, Rosenberg, Sorin,
see [18, 20, 27, 21], and also [25, 29, 9] for some recent results.
A basic analytic tool to establish the existence of the limit is the so called non-
linear ergodic equation
T (u) = λ1+ u .(4)
If a solution (λ, u) ∈ R× Rn exists, then, it it easily seen that
χ(T ) = λ1 .
In particular, the mean payoff is independent of the initial state, and it is given by
the ergodic constant λ, as in the case of Markov chains. The ergodic equation has
been much studied in the one-player stochastic case, i.e., in “ergodic control”, where
it is also known as the “average case optimality equation”, see [16] for background.
The ergodic equation (4) is equivalent to a nonlinear spectral problem which
has also received attention in nonlinear Perron-Frobenius theory, see specially the
work of Nussbaum [22, 23], and also [15, 19]. Indeed, the map T is conjugate to
the self-map G = exp ◦T ◦ log of the interior of the standard positive cone of Rn,
C := {x ∈ Rn | x > 0}, where exp is the map from Rn to the interior of C which
does exp entrywise, and log := exp−1. The ergodic problem is equivalent to the
nonlinear spectral problem
G(v) = µv, v ∈ intC, µ > 0 .(5)
Since the map G is order-preserving and positively homogeneous of degree one,
conditions for the existence of an eigenpair (v, µ) may be thought of as nonlinear
extensions of the Perron-Frobenius theorem. It is useful to keep this equivalence in
mind as several results relevant to Problem (4) have appeared in the context of the
nonlinear eigenproblem (5), see for instance [15, 10].
The problem of characterizing the set of solutions u of the ergodic equation
T (u) = λ1+u has also appeared in the setting of max-plus spectral theory [6, 3], and
in weak KAM theory [12, 13]. These theories concern the one-player deterministic
case. It is known that the above set is sup-norm isometric to a set of Lipschitz
functions on a certain set (critical classes in the max-plus setting, or projected
Aubry set in the weak KAM setting). Some of these results have been extended
to one-player stochastic games with finite state space in [1]. The extension of such
results to the two player case appears to be an open question, which is among the
motivations leading to the present study.
A useful tool to address the issue of the solvability of the ergodic equation (4), or
of the corresponding nonlinear eigenproblem (5), is the recession function associated
with the Shapley operator,
(6) Tˆ : x ∈ Rn 7→ Tˆ (x) = lim
ρ→+∞
T (ρx)
ρ
,
which has already been used in several ways [27, 28, 15]. In particular, Rosenberg
and Sorin [27] gave conditions for the existence of the mean payoff vector of a
two-person zero-sum stochastic game. In their framework, the recession function
appears as the Shapley operator of the “projective” game, which corresponds to the
game with no running payments.
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If the transition payment r is bounded, the recession function Tˆ does exist, and
it is given by
(7) [Tˆ (x)]i = inf
a∈Ai
sup
b∈Bi
P abi x, i ∈ S, x ∈ R
n .
Hence, Tˆ = T (0, P ), with T as in (3), so that the recession function of the Shapley
operator associated with the game with payment function r is merely the Shapley
operator of the game in which r is replaced by 0. For this reason, we shall refer to
the maps of the form (7) as payment-free Shapley operators.
Observe that every constant vector is a fixed point of a payment-free Shapley
operator. We shall refer to such a fixed point as trivial. In [15], Gaubert and
Gunawardena show that the ergodic equation is solvable if Tˆ has only trivial fixed
points. A sufficient explicit condition for this to hold, involving a sequence of aggre-
gated directed graphs, generalizing the classical directed graph of Perron-Frobenius
theory, was given there.
Then, in [10], Cavazos-Cadena and Herna´ndez-Herna´ndez introduced a weak
convexity property, and showed that when the conjugate map G = exp ◦T ◦ log is
weakly convex, the recession function Tˆ has only trivial fixed points if and only if
the first of the directed graphs of [15] consists of a single final class and of trivial
classes (reduced to one node, and loop free). They deduced that when G is weakly
convex, the ergodic equation for all maps g + T with g ∈ Rn is solvable if and only
if Tˆ has only trivial fixed points. We shall consider the same additive perturbations
g + T of the Shapley operator, but without any assumption on T except that the
payment r be bounded. Indeed, this weak convexity property is rarely satisfied for
games although it captures an interesting class of risk sensitive problems.
1.2. Description of the main results. Our main results, summarized in Theo-
rem 8.1 at the end of the paper, show that most of the classical characterizations
of ergodicity for finite state Markov chains, seen as zero-player games, carry over
to the two-player case. More precisely, given a zero-sum game with finite state
space and bounded transition payment r, we show in Section 3 that the following
conditions are equivalent:
(i) all the fixed points of the recession function Tˆ of the Shapley operator T
are trivial (i.e constant);
(ii) all the games obtained by adding to the transition payment r a perturba-
tion depending only of the state have a constant mean payoff vector;
(iii) the ergodic equation (4) is solvable for all maps g + T with g ∈ Rn.
In the zero-player special case, the above conditions correspond to Points (i)–(iii)
of Theorem 1.1. Hence, a zero-sum game will be said to be ergodic if it satisfies one
of these properties. An ingredient of this equivalence is the result of Gaubert and
Gunawardena in [15] described above.
In Section 4, we give a characterization of ergodicity in terms of a Galois connec-
tion acting on faces of the hypercube [0, 1]n. Then, in Section 5, we show that under
a compactness assumption on the action spaces and a continuity assumption on the
transition probability, the latter characterization of ergodicity of a game (involving
a Galois connection) is equivalent to a reachability condition involving a pair of
directed hypergraphs. These two characterizations are a fundamental discrepancy
with Point (iv) of the zero-player case. However, the characterization of ergodicity
involving the hypergraphs still keeps the same flavor. Indeed, the condition that a
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directed graph has only one final class can be thought of as an accessibility condi-
tion in this directed graph (see in particular Remark 5.1). Under the compactness
and continuity assumption on the action spaces and the transition probability, the
Galois connection as well as the hypergraphs are shown to depend only on the sup-
port of the transition probability P , which we define to be the set of points at which
the function (i, a, b, j) 7→ (P abi )j takes nonzero values. As a result, we get that the
ergodicity of a game is a structural property depending only on the support of the
transition probability.
We then consider (in Section 6) several algorithmic problems concerning games
with finite action spaces. The first one is to check ergodicity. The restricted ver-
sion of this problem concerning deterministic games was addressed by Yang and
Zhao [31], in the context of discrete event systems. They showed that this problem
is coNP-hard. However we show, as a corollary of the hypergraph characterization,
that checking the ergodicity of a stochastic game is fixed parameter tractable: if
the dimension is fixed, we can solve it in polynomial time. Note also that ergodicity
can be checked in polynomial time for one-player stochastic games [1]. We finally
characterize the situation in which there exists a fixed point having its minimal
and maximal entries in prescribed positions. As a by product, we get a polynomial
time algorithm to check the latter property, from which it follows that checking
ergodicity is a coNP-complete problem. In Section 7, we illustrate our results on
some examples.
The present results have been announced in the conference article [4].
2. Zero-sum games with perfect information and mean-payoff
2.1. Basic definitions and results. In this subsection, we describe formally the
zero-sum game with perfect information mentioned above, and state preliminary
results.
Recall that S = [n] is the state space, Ai is the set of actions of player MIN, Bi
is the set of actions of player MAX, (i, a, b) 7→ rabi from ∪i∈S({i} × Ai × Bi) to R
is the transition payment, and (i, a, b) 7→ P abi from the same set to ∆(S) ⊂ R
1×n,
the set of nonnegative row vectors of sum one, is the transition probability. This
game, which we denote by Γ(r, P ), is played as follows. Starting from a given state
i0 at time k = 0, known by the players, MIN chooses an action a0 ∈ Ai0 . Then,
knowing this choice, playerMAX chooses an action b0 ∈ Bi0 . PlayerMIN has to pay
ra0b0i0 to player MAX and the next state, i1, is chosen according to the probability
P a0b0i0 . The same procedure is repeated at each time step, giving an infinite sequence
(iℓ, aℓ, bℓ)ℓ>0.
A strategy σ (resp. τ) of player MIN (resp. MAX) is a map which assigns an
action of player MIN (resp. MAX) to every finite history known by the player. A
triple (i0, σ, τ) defines a probability measure on the set of plays (or histories), that
is, the set of sequences (iℓ, aℓ, bℓ)ℓ>0 for which aℓ ∈ Aiℓ and bℓ ∈ Biℓ . We denote
by Ei0,σ,τ the corresponding expectation. The total payoff of the game with finite
horizon k (consisting in k time steps, that is k successive alternated moves of players
MIN and MAX) is given by
Jki0(σ, τ) = Ei0,σ,τ
[
k−1∑
ℓ=0
raℓbℓiℓ
]
.
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PlayerMIN wishes to minimize this quantity, while player MAX wishes to maximize
it. The value of the k-stage game (the game played in finite horizon k) starting at
state i is thus defined as
vki = infσ
sup
τ
Jki (σ, τ) ,
the infimum and the supremum being taken over the set of strategies of playersMIN
and MAX, respectively. Here, the infimum and supremum commute.
It is known (see e.g. [21]) that the value vector vk = (vki ) satisfies v
k = T (vk−1)
and v0 = 0, where T = T (r, P ) is the Shapley operator defined by (3).
Let A denote the set of (feedback) policies of player MIN, which are the maps
σ from S to ∪i∈SAi such that σ(i) ∈ Ai for all i ∈ S, and let B denote the set of
policies of player MAX, which are the maps τ from ∪i∈S({i} ×Ai) to ∪i∈SBi such
that τ(i, a) ∈ Bi for all i ∈ S and a ∈ Ai. Recall that a strategy of player MIN
(resp. MAX) is Markovian if it only depends on the information of the current stage
k > 0, that is ak = σk(ik) for some σk ∈ A (resp. bk = τk(ik, ak) for some τk ∈ B).
Moreover, such a strategy is stationary if it is independent of k (σk = σ ∈ A and
τk = τ for all k > 0), in which case it can be identified with the corresponding
policy. Then it is known that the above (dynamic programming) equation provides
optimal or ǫ-optimal strategies of the two players that are Markovian. Indeed, T
can be rewritten as follows:
T (x) = inf
σ∈A
sup
τ∈B
(rστ + P στx) = sup
τ∈B
inf
σ∈A
(rστ + P στx) ,
where P στi = P
σ(i)τ(i,σ(i))
i , and similarly for r
στ , and the infimum and supremum
are taken for the usual partial order of Rn (the product partial order of the usual
order on R). Moreover, the infimum and supremum can be approached arbitrarily
by the value of rστ + P στx for some policies σ and τ , and they are equal to such
a value when the action spaces Ai and Bi are compact and the transition payment
and probability functions are continuous. In the latter case, we say that σ and τ
are optimal for T (x). Optimal strategies for the game in horizon k > 0 are then
obtained by taking for all 0 6 ℓ < k, aℓ = σℓ(iℓ) and bℓ = τℓ(iℓ, aℓ) for some σℓ ∈ A
and τℓ ∈ B optimal for T (v
k−ℓ−1).
The Shapley operator T satisfies the following properties:
- monotonicity, a.k.a. order preservation: x 6 y ⇒ T (x) 6 T (y), where
Rn is endowed with its usual partial order;
- additive homogeneity: T (x+ α1) = T (x) + α1, x ∈ Rn, α ∈ R, recalling
that 1 denotes the unit vector of Rn;
- nonexpansiveness in the sup-norm: ‖T (x)− T (y)‖ 6 ‖x − y‖, x, y ∈ Rn,
where ‖x‖ := max16i6n |xi|.
2.2. Games with mean payoff. The mean payoff vector is defined as the limit
χ(T ) = lim
k→∞
T k(x)
k
,
for all x ∈ Rn. Since T is nonexpansive, the existence and the value of the latter
limit is independent of the choice of x. In particular, we have the following standard
result:
Proposition 2.1. If the following ergodic equation is solvable:
(8) ∃(λ, u) ∈ R× Rn, T (u) = λ1+ u ,
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then χ(T ) exists and is equal to λ1. In particular, the average payment (per time
unit) of Γ(r, P ) is asymptotically independent of the initial state.
Proof. Since T is additively homogeneous, we have T k(u) = kλ1+u, and so χ(T ) =
limk→∞ T
k(u)/k = λ1. 
Moreover, if u is a solution of the above ergodic equation, optimal policies σ and
τ of players MIN and MAX for T (u), if they exist, provide optimal strategies of the
two players that are Markovian and stationary.
The ergodic equation (8) can be studied by means of the recession function Tˆ
of T , defined by (6). The recession function of T is well defined as soon as the
transition payment is bounded. Then, Tˆ is given by (7), so that Tˆ = T (0, P ).
Definition 2.1 (Payment-free Shapley operators). A Shapley operator is said to
be payment-free if it is of the form F = T (0, P ), where P is a transition probability
and T is as in (3).
As any Shapley operator, a payment-free Shapley operator F is monotone and
additively homogeneous. It is also positively homogeneous, that is, F (λx) = λF (x),
for all x ∈ Rn, λ > 0. As a consequence, it satisfies F (λ1) = λ1 for every λ ∈ R.
We call such fixed points the trivial fixed points of F . We shall use the following
sufficient condition for the solvability of the ergodic equation.
Theorem 2.2 (Corollary of Gaubert and Gunawardena [15, Theorems 9 and 13]).
Consider a game Γ(r, P ), such that the recession function Tˆ exists. Then, if Tˆ has
only trivial fixed points, the ergodic equation (8) is solvable.
3. Realizable mean payoffs
We now show that the recession function of the Shapley operator T of the game
Γ(r, P ) can be used to characterize the realizable mean payoff vectors of the games
Γ(r + g, P ), where g is a bounded additive perturbation of the transition payment
r.
Observe first that such a bounded additive perturbation g of the transition pay-
ment r does not change the recession function T̂ = T (0, P ). Moreover, combining
Theorem 2.2 and Proposition 2.1, we get that if T̂ has only trivial fixed points, then
χ(T ) exists and is a constant vector. When the mean payoff vector is already known
to exist, the following result, noted by several authors, extends this assertion, since
it concerns also the case where Tˆ has non trivial fixed points.
Proposition 3.1 (See [27, 28, 15]). Consider a game Γ(r, P ), such that the recession
function Tˆ and the mean payoff vector χ = χ(T ) exist. Then Tˆ (χ) = χ.
We give the short proof for the convenience of the reader.
Proof. Since T is nonexpansive in the sup-norm ‖ · ‖, we have, for every vectors x, y
and every integer n, ∥∥∥T (nx)− T (ny)
n
∥∥∥ 6 ‖x− y‖ .
Hence, taking x = χ and y = T n(0)/n, we get∥∥∥T (nχ)
n
−
T n+1(0)
n
∥∥∥ 6 ∥∥∥χ− T n(0)
n
∥∥∥ .
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All the terms in the above inequality converge. Taking their limit, we obtain
‖Tˆ (χ)− χ‖ 6 0 .

We can also show a converse statement, leading to the following equivalences.
Proposition 3.2 (Realizable mean payoffs). Let us fix a state space S = {1, . . . , n},
and the actions spaces Ai and Bi of the two players. Consider a payment-free
Shapley operator F = T (0, P ) with transition probability P , and T as in (3). Then,
the following assertions are equivalent:
(i) ν ∈ Rn is a fixed point of F ;
(ii) there exist a bounded transition payment r such that the mean payoff vector
of the game Γ(r, P ) exists and is equal to ν;
(iii) there exist a transition payment r such that the recession function Tˆ and
the mean payoff vector of the game Γ(r, P ) exist and are equal to F and ν
respectively.
Proof. The implication (ii)⇒(iii) is easy, and the implication (iii)⇒(i) comes from
Proposition 3.1. Let us show (i)⇒(ii).
Consider the transition payment r such that rabi = νi for every i ∈ S and ev-
ery (a, b) ∈ Ai × Bi. The Shapley operator T of the game Γ(r, P ) satisfies, by
construction, T (x) = F (x) + ν for all x ∈ Rn.
For every integer k we have T (kν) = kF (ν)+ν = (k+1)ν, so that, by induction,
T k(0) = kν. This proves that the mean payoff vector of Γ(r, P ) exists and is equal
to ν. 
Hence, for parametric games Γ(·, P ) with fixed state space, action spaces and
transition probability, the fixed points of the corresponding payment-free Shapley
operator give exactly all the realizable mean payoff vectors.
We shall say that the game Γ(r, P ) is ergodic if it satisfies the conditions of the
following theorem.
Theorem 3.1 (Ergodicity of zero-sum games). Let us fix a state space S = {1, . . . , n},
and the actions spaces Ai and Bi of the two players. Let r be a bounded transition
payment, P be a transition probability, and let T = T (r, P ) be the Shapley operator
of the game Γ(r, P ). Then, the following properties are equivalent:
(i) the recession function T̂ = T (0, P ) has only trivial fixed points;
(ii) the mean payoff vector of the game Γ(r + g, P ) does exist and is constant
for all additive perturbations g of the transition payment depending only of
the state (so ga,bi = gi, for all i ∈ S, a ∈ Ai and b ∈ Bi);
(iii) the ergodic equation g + T (u) = λ1+ u is solvable for all vectors g ∈ Rn;
(iv) the mean payoff vector of the game Γ(r + g, P ) does exist and is constant
for all bounded additive perturbations g of the transition payment r;
(v) the ergodic equation T ′(u) = λ1 + u admits a solution (λ, u) ∈ R × Rn,
for all Shapley operators T ′ = T (r + g, P ) associated to bounded additive
perturbations g of the transition payment.
Proof. As said above, a bounded additive perturbation g of the transition payment
r does not change the recession function: T̂ = T (0, P ) = T̂ ′, when T ′ = T (r+g, P ).
Hence the implication (i)⇒(v) follows from Theorem 2.2. Moreover, the implication
(v)⇒(iv) follows from Proposition 2.1. Similarly, we have (iii)⇒(ii), since if g is an
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additive perturbation of the transition payment depending only of the state (that
is ga,bi = gi, for all i ∈ S, a ∈ Ai and b ∈ Bi), then T (r + g, P ) = g + T (r, P ). The
implications (v)⇒(iii) and (iv)⇒(ii) are trivial.
Hence, all the equivalences will follow from the implication (ii)⇒(i), that we
now prove. Assume that (ii) holds. This means that the mean payoff vector of
the game Γ(r + g, P ) does exist and is constant for all additive perturbations g of
the transition payment depending only of the state. Let η be a fixed point of the
recession function T̂ = T (0, P ). Denote T = T (r, P ), and let C > 0 be a bound of
the transition payment r. We have
(9) − C + T̂ (x) 6 T (x) 6 C + T̂ (x), ∀x ∈ Rn .
Let s be an integer, consider the additive perturbation gs = sη of the transition
payment, and denote Ts = T (r + gs, P ) = gs + T . Let us show by induction:
(10) k(sη − C) 6 (Ts)
k(0) 6 k(sη + C) .
Indeed, Ts(0) = sη+T (0) and by (9), we get that −C 6 T (0) 6 C, which shows (10)
for k = 1. Assume that (10) holds for k > 1. Then, by the monotonicity of Ts, we
get that (Ts)
k+1(0) 6 Ts(k(sη +C)). Then, using the definition of Ts, the additive
homogeneity of T and (9), we deduce: Ts(k(sη + C)) = sη + T (ksη + kC) =
sη + kC + T (ksη) 6 sη + (k + 1)C + T̂ (ksη). Since T̂ is positively homogeneous
and η is a fixed point of T̂ we obtain that T̂ (ksη) = ksη, hence Ts(k(sη + C)) 6
sη + (k + 1)C + ksη = (k + 1)(sη + C), which shows the second inequality of (10)
for k + 1. The first inequality is obtained with the same arguments.
Now, by (ii) the mean payoff vector limk→∞(Ts)
k(0)/k = χs of the game Γ(r +
gs, P ) exists and is constant. From (10), we deduce that
sη − C 6 χs 6 sη + C .
Since χs is a constant vector, we get that s(maxi∈S ηi)−C 6 (χs)j 6 s(mini∈S ηi)+
C for all j ∈ S. Hence, s(maxi∈S ηi − mini∈S ηi) 6 2C, and since this inequality
holds for all s > 0, we deduce that maxi∈S ηi −mini∈S ηi = 0. This implies that η
is a constant vector, hence any fixed point of the recession function T̂ is a constant
vector, which shows Assertion (i).
Note that we could have shown the direct implication (iv)⇒(i), by using the
implication (i)⇒(ii) in Proposition 3.2. 
4. Characterization of ergodicity in terms of Galois connections
In this section, we shall fix a state space S = [n], and consider any payment-free
Shapley operator F defined over S, without specifying the actions spaces Ai and Bi
of the two players nor the transition probability P . Indeed, the results of this section
only use the fact that F : Rn → Rn is order-preserving, additively homogeneous,
and positively homogeneous.
4.1. Invariant faces of the hypercube. We begin with an observation about the
fixed points of a payment-free Shapley operator. But first, let us fix some notation.
If K is a subset of S, denote by 1K the vector with entries 1 on K and 0 on S \K.
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Lemma 4.1. Let F be a payment-free Shapley operator. If u is a nontrivial fixed
point of F then, denoting by I = argminu and J = argmaxu, we have
F (1S\I) 6 1S\I ,(H1)
1J 6 F (1J) .(H2)
Proof. By the additive and positive homogeneity of F , we may assume that 1S\I 6 u
and that mins∈S us = 0. Hence, by the monotonicity of F , we get that F (1S\I) 6 u.
In particular, we have [F (1S\I)]i 6 0 for every i ∈ I. Since 1S\I 6 1, we also have
F (1S\I) 6 1 (recall that any trivial vector is a fixed point of F ). It follows that
F (1S\I) 6 1S\I .
We show the second inequality using the same arguments (but this time assuming
that u 6 1J and maxs∈S us = 1). 
Remark 4.1. Note that the hypercube [0, 1]n is invariant by F . Hence, (H1)
is equivalent to the fact that [F (1S\I)]i = 0 for every i ∈ I. Likewise, (H2) is
equivalent to [F (1J )]j = 1 for every j ∈ J .
Remark 4.2. Conditions (H1) and (H2) are dual. Indeed, introduce F˜ the con-
jugate operator of F defined by F˜ (x) := −F (−x). Then, F˜ is a payment-free
Shapley operator (obtained from F by changing min to max and vice versa). More-
over, F˜ (x) = 1 − F (1 − x), so F˜ (1I) = 1 − F (1S\I) for all subsets I of S, and
condition (H1) holds for F and I if, and only if, condition (H2) holds for F˜ and I.
Furthermore, if u is a nontrivial fixed point of F , then the vector u˜ := 1− u is a
nontrivial fixed point of F˜ , verifying argmax u˜ = argminu.
Conditions (H1) and (H2) can be stated in geometric terms. Given two subsets
I and J of S, denote by C−I := {x ∈ [0, 1]
n | ∀i ∈ I, xi = 0} and by C
+
J :=
{x ∈ [0, 1]n | ∀j ∈ J, xj = 1} two faces of the hypercube. We shall call them
lower and upper faces, respectively. Note that they can alternatively be defined by
C−I = {x ∈ [0, 1]
n | x 6 1S\I} and C
+
J = {x ∈ [0, 1]
n | x > 1J}. Hence, by the
monotonicity of F , we easily get the following.
Proposition 4.1. Let F be a payment-free Shapley operator. Let I and J be two
subsets of S. Then
(H1) ⇔ F (C−I ) ⊂ C
−
I ,
(H2) ⇔ F (C+J ) ⊂ C
+
J .
Conditions (H1) and (H2) are thus equivalent to the invariance of faces of the
hypercube.
4.2. Galois connection. We first recall the definition of a Galois connection be-
tween lattices, as introduced by Birkhoff [8] for lattices of subsets and then gener-
alized by Ore [24]. Let (A,≺A) and (B,≺B) be two partially ordered sets and let
ϕ : A → B and γ : B → A. The map ϕ is said to be antitone if a ≺A a
′ implies
ϕ(a′) ≺B ϕ(a). The pair (ϕ, γ) is a Galois connection between A and B if one of
the following equivalent assertions is verified:
idA ≺A γ ◦ ϕ, idB ≺B ϕ ◦ γ, ϕ and γ are antitone,(11a)
∀a ∈ A, ∀b ∈ B,
(
b ≺B ϕ(a)⇔ a ≺A γ(b)
)
,(11b)
∀b ∈ B, γ(b) = maxA{a; b ≺B ϕ(a)} ,(11c)
∀a ∈ A, ϕ(a) = maxB{b; a ≺A γ(b)} ,(11d)
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where, given a partially ordered set (E,≺E), idE is the identity map over E and
maxEX states for the maximum of the subset X ⊂ E with respect to the partial
order ≺E .
If (ϕ, γ) is a Galois connection between A and B, then (γ, ϕ) is a Galois con-
nection between B and A, and according to (11c) (resp. to (11d)), γ (resp. ϕ) is
uniquely determined by ϕ (resp. γ). Denote by ϕ⋆ := γ and likewise by γ⋆ := ϕ.
These maps have the following properties:
b = ϕ(a) ⇒ ϕ⋆(b) = maxA{a; b = ϕ(a)} ,
ϕ ◦ ϕ⋆ ◦ ϕ = ϕ and ϕ⋆ ◦ ϕ ◦ ϕ⋆ = ϕ⋆ ,(
∃a ∈ A, b = ϕ(a)
)
⇔ ϕ ◦ ϕ⋆(b) = b ,
(ϕ⋆)⋆ = ϕ .
We say that an element a ∈ A (resp. b ∈ B) is closed with respect to the Galois
connection (ϕ, ϕ⋆) (resp. (ϕ⋆, ϕ)) if a = ϕ⋆ ◦ ϕ(a) (resp. b = ϕ ◦ ϕ⋆(b)). We can
show that the set of closed elements in A with respect to (ϕ, ϕ⋆) is A¯ := ϕ⋆(B) and
that the set of closed elements in B with respect to (ϕ⋆, ϕ) is B¯ := ϕ(A). Then, ϕ
is an isomorphism from A¯ to B¯, and its inverse is ϕ⋆
Given a payment-free Shapley operator F , we denote by F− (resp. F+) the
families of subsets of S verifying (H1) (resp. (H2)):
F− :=
{
I ⊂ S | F (1S\I) 6 1S\I
}
,
F+ :=
{
J ⊂ S | 1J 6 F (1J )
}
.
These families F− and F+ are lattices of subsets with respect to the inclusion
partial order. Indeed, since F is order preserving, for all I1, I2 ∈ F
−, we have
F (1S\(I1∪I2)) = F
(
inf(1S\I1 ,1S\I2)
)
6 inf
(
F (1S\I1), F (1S\I2)
)
6 inf(1S\I1 ,1S\I2) = 1S\(I1∪I2),
so that I1 ∪ I2 ∈ F
−. This implies that the supremum of two sets in F− coincides
with their supremum in the powerset lattice P(S) of S, i.e., the union I1∪I2. Hence,
F− is a sub-supsemilattice of P(S). Then, since F− has a bottom element (the
empty set) and since it is a finite ordered set, it is automatically an inf-semilattice:
the infimum of two sets I1, I2 ∈ F
− is given by ∪I3∈F−,I3⊂I1,I3⊂I2I3. Note that the
latter infimum may differ from the infimum in P(S) (the intersection). The lattice
F+ has dual properties. According to the geometric interpretation, the two lattices
F− and F+ can be identified with the families of lower and upper invariant faces
of the hypercube, respectively. Note that F− and F+ both contain ∅ and S.
Given I ∈ F−, we are interested in the subsets J ∈ F+ satisfying I ∩J = ∅ (see
Lemma 4.1). We shall consider in particular the greatest subset J with the latter
property. Vice versa, starting from a subset J , we may consider the greatest subset
I with the same property. In geometric terms, to each lower invariant face C−I of
[0, 1]n we associate the smallest upper invariant face C+J with nonempty intersection
with C−I . This defines a Galois connection between the lattices F
− and F+.
Let (Φ,Φ⋆) be the pair of functions from F− (resp. F+) to F+ (resp. F−), that
have just been introduced. Formally, they are defined for every I ∈ F− and J ∈ F+
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by:
(12) Φ(I) :=
⋃
J∈F+, I∩J=∅
J and Φ⋆(J) :=
⋃
I∈F−, I∩J=∅
I .
It follows from this definition that Φ and Φ⋆ are antitone, and that I ⊂ Φ⋆ ◦ Φ(I)
and J ⊂ Φ ◦ Φ⋆(J). Hence condition (11a) is satisfied for the pair (Φ,Φ⋆) which
proves that it is a Galois connection between the lattices of subsets F− and F+.
We now explore some properties of this Galois connection. By a simple applica-
tion of the definitions, we can first complete Lemma 4.1.
Lemma 4.2. Let F be a payment-free Shapley operator. If u is a nontrivial fixed
point of F , then argminu ∈ F− and argmax u ∈ F+. Furthermore, we have
argmaxu ⊂ Φ(argmin u) and argminu ⊂ Φ⋆(argmax u). 
For x ∈ Rn, we shall use the notation
Fω(x) := lim
k→∞
F k(x)
as soon as the latter limit exists. This is the case in particular when F (x) 6 x or x 6
F (x). Indeed, since F is order-preserving, the former (resp. latter) inequality implies
that the sequence (F k(x))k>0 is nonincreasing (resp. nondecreasing). Moreover,
since F is nonexpansive and has a fixed point (namely, 0), the sequence (F k(x))k>0
is bounded, so that it converges as k tends to infinity. Moreover, Fω(x) is necessarily
a fixed point of F .
Lemma 4.3. Let F be a payment-free Shapley operator. Let I ∈ F− (resp. J ∈ F+)
such that Φ(I) 6= ∅ (resp. Φ⋆(J) 6= ∅). Then, argmaxFω(1S\I) = Φ(I) (resp.
argminFω(1J ) = Φ
⋆(J)).
Furthermore, if I (resp. J) is closed with respect to the Galois connection (Φ,Φ⋆)
(resp. (Φ⋆,Φ)), then argminFω(1S\I) = I (resp. argmaxF
ω(1J) = J).
Proof. Firstly, note that since F (1S\I) 6 1S\I , the sequence (F
k(1S\I))k>0 is non-
increasing and so the limit u := Fω(1S\I) does exist. Since F leaves [0, 1]
n invariant,
we have u ∈ [0, 1]n.
Secondly, by definition of the Galois connection, we have 1Φ(I) 6 1S\I . Using
the monotonicity of F and the characterization of F− and F+, we get that 1Φ(I) 6
F (1Φ(I)) 6 F (1S\I) 6 1S\I . Since F is monotone, we get that 1Φ(I) 6 F
k(1Φ(I)) 6
F k(1S\I) 6 1S\I . It follows that 1Φ(I) 6 u 6 1S\I and we deduce that I ⊂
argminu and Φ(I) ⊂ argmaxu. Since Φ is antitone, we have Φ(argminu) ⊂
Φ(I) ⊂ argmax u.
The vector u being a fixed point of F , we know from Lemma 4.2 that argmin u ∈
F−, argmaxu ∈ F+, and argmaxu ⊂ Φ(argmin u). Hence, we have by the previ-
ous inclusions, Φ(argminu) = Φ(I) = argmaxu.
Suppose now that I is closed with respect to the Galois connection. This
means that Φ⋆(Φ(I)) = I. Then, from the previous equalities, we get that Φ⋆ ◦
Φ(argmin u) = I. This implies that argminu ⊂ I and since we already know that
I ⊂ argminu, we can conclude that I = argminu.
The analogous results for J ∈ F+ follow by duality. 
We say that a subset of states is proper if it differs from the empty set and from
the whole set of states. We say that I, J ⊂ S are conjugate subsets of states with
respect to the Galois connection (Φ,Φ⋆) if I ∈ F− \∅, J ∈ F+ \∅ and if J = Φ(I)
and I = Φ⋆(J).
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Theorem 4.4. Consider a payment-free Shapley operator F . The following asser-
tions are equivalent:
(i) F has a nontrivial fixed point;
(ii) there exist non empty disjoint subsets I, J ⊂ S such that I ∈ F− and
J ∈ F+;
(iii) there exists a proper subset of states I ∈ F− such that Φ(I) 6= ∅;
(iv) there exists a proper subset of states J ∈ F+ such that Φ⋆(J) 6= ∅;
(v) there exists a proper subset of states that is closed with respect to the Galois
connection (Φ,Φ⋆) or (Φ⋆,Φ);
(vi) there exists a pair of conjugate subsets of states with respect to the Galois
connection (Φ,Φ⋆).
Proof. (i)⇒(ii): Assume that (i) holds and consider a nontrivial fixed point u of F .
Then denoting by I := argminu and by J := argmaxu, we know, by Lemma 4.1,
that I ∈ F− and J ∈ F+. Since u is nontrivial, we also have I ∩ J = ∅, which
shows (ii).
(ii)⇒(iii) and (ii)⇒(iv): If (ii) holds, then by definition of the Galois connection we
have J ⊂ Φ(I) and I ⊂ Φ⋆(J), thus Φ(I) 6= ∅ and Φ⋆(J) 6= ∅, which shows both
(iii) and (iv).
(iii)⇒(v): Let I be a subset as in (iii), that is I ∈ F− is proper such that Φ(I) 6= ∅.
We cannot have Φ(I) = S, since otherwise, this would implies that I ⊂ Φ⋆(Φ(I)) =
∅. Hence, Φ(I) is proper. Moreover, we know that Φ(I) is closed with respect to
the Galois connection (Φ⋆,Φ), which shows (one case of) (v).
(iv)⇒(v): Similarly if J ∈ F+ is proper such that Φ⋆(J) 6= ∅, then Φ⋆(J) is proper
and closed with respect to the Galois connection (Φ,Φ⋆), which shows (v).
(v)⇒(i): Suppose for instance that I ∈ F− is proper and closed with respect to the
Galois connection (Φ,Φ⋆). We have Φ(I) 6= ∅, since otherwise I = Φ⋆(Φ(I)) = S.
By the first assertion of Lemma 4.3, we get that u = Fω(1S\I) is a fixed point of
F with an argmax equal to Φ(I). By the second assertion of Lemma 4.3, we obtain
that argminu = I. Since I ∩ Φ(I) = ∅ and neither I nor Φ(I) is empty, u is a
nontrivial fixed point of F , which shows (i). The same conclusion holds if there
is a proper subset of states J ∈ F+, closed with respect to the Galois connection
(Φ⋆,Φ).
(v)⇔(vi): This follows readily from the definition of conjugate subsets of states. 
5. Ergodicity only depends on the support of the transition
probability
Let us fix now a state space S = [n]. Here, given the actions spaces Ai and Bi
of the two players, and the transition probability P , we consider the payment-free
Shapley operator F = T (0, P ), with T as in (3).
5.1. Boolean abstractions. We call upper and lower Boolean abstractions of the
payment-free Shapley operator F , the operators respectively defined on {0, 1}n by
[F+(x)]i := min
a∈Ai
max
b∈Bi
max
j:(Pabi )j>0
xj , i ∈ S ,(13)
[F−(x)]i := min
a∈Ai
max
b∈Bi
min
j:(Pab
i
)j>0
xj , i ∈ S .(14)
These Boolean operators can be extended to Rn. Then, we have F− 6 F 6 F+.
We now make some observations. Firstly, the expressions of F+ and F− involve
the operators min and max (instead of inf and sup). This owes to the fact that
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the action spaces are nonempty, and the state space is finite, hence, given x ∈
Rn, the min and max operations are applied to nonempty subsets of the finite set
{xi}i∈S . Secondly, F
+ and F− are only determined by the support of the transition
probability, that is the set of (i, a, b, j) such that (P abi )j > 0. Finally,
(
F˜
)+
= (˜F−),
recalling that F˜ is the conjugate operator of F defined by F˜ (x) = −F (−x).
These Boolean operators are helpful to characterize the families F− and F+ as
well as the Galois connection (Φ,Φ⋆). However, we need to make the following
assumption.
Assumption A.
(i) For every state i ∈ S, the action spaces Ai and Bi are nonempty compact
sets;
(ii) The transition probability P is separately continuous, meaning that given
i ∈ S and a ∈ Ai the function b ∈ Bi 7→ P
ab
i ∈ ∆(S) is continuous,
and given i ∈ S and b ∈ Bi the function a ∈ Ai 7→ P
ab
i ∈ ∆(S) is also
continuous.
This assumption implies in particular the existence of optimal policies for both
players, a property which is used implicitly in the proof of the following result.
Lemma 5.1. Let F be the payment-free Shapley operator associated with the actions
spaces Ai and Bi of the two players, and the transition probability P , and let F
+
and F− be defined by (13) and (14) respectively. For all subsets I and J of S,
consider the conditions:
F+(1S\I) 6 1S\I ,(H1’)
1J 6 F
−(1J) .(H2’)
We have (H1’) ⇒ (H1) and (H2’) ⇒ (H2). Moreover, under Assumption A, we
have: (H1) ⇒ (H1’) and (H2) ⇒ (H2’).
Proof. Since F− 6 F 6 F+, the implications (H1’) ⇒ (H1) and (H2’) ⇒ (H2) are
trivial. It remains to show the reverse of these implications under Assumption A.
Let us first make some observations. First, for all x ∈ [0, 1]n, i ∈ S, a ∈ Ai and
b ∈ Bi, we have
(15) P abi x 6 0⇔ (P
ab
i )j = 0 or xj = 0 ∀j ∈ S ⇔ max
j:(Pab
i
)j>0
xj = 0 ,
since all entries of P abi and x are nonnegative. Similarly
(16) P abi x > 1⇔ min
j:(Pab
i
)j>0
xj = 1 ,
since all entries of x are less or equal to 1, and P abi x = 1− P
ab
i (1− x).
Next, for all x ∈ Rn, by Assumption A, for all i ∈ S and a ∈ Ai there exists
b ∈ Bi depending on i and a such that P
ab
i x = maxb′∈Bi P
ab′
i x (the supremum is
thus a maximum). Assumption A also implies that, for all i ∈ S and b ∈ Bi, the map
Ai → R, a 7→ P
ab
i x is continuous. Since the supremum of continuous maps is lower
semicontinuous, we get that for all i ∈ S, the map Ai → R, a 7→ maxb∈Bi P
ab
i x is
lower semicontinuous. Since Ai is compact, this implies that, for all i ∈ S, there
exists a ∈ Ai such that maxb′∈Bi P
ab′
i x = mina′∈Ai maxb′∈Bi P
a′b′
i x = [F (x)]i.
Let us now show (H1)⇒(H1’). Assume (H1), that is F (1S\I) 6 1S\I . This
implies that [F (1S\I)]i 6 0 for all i ∈ I. By the last observation above, given i ∈ I,
there exists a ∈ Ai such that maxb∈Bi(P
ab
i 1S\I) = [F (1S\I)]i 6 0. Then, for all
ERGODICITY CONDITIONS FOR ZERO-SUM GAMES 15
b ∈ Bi, P
ab
i 1S\I 6 0, which implies, by (15), that maxj:(Pabi )j>0[1S\I ]i = 0. Since
this last equality holds for some a ∈ Ai and all b ∈ Bi, we deduce that
[F+(1S\I)]i = min
a∈Ai
max
b∈Bi
max
j:(Pabi )j>0
[1S\I ]j = 0, for all i ∈ I ,
hence F+(1S\I) 6 1S\I .
With similar arguments, we show that (H2)⇒(H2’). 
In the sequel, we shall also consider the sets F ′− and F ′+ defined like F− and
F+, but with the conditions (H1’) and (H2’) instead of the conditions (H1) and
(H2) respectively:
F ′− :=
{
I ⊂ S | F+(1S\I) 6 1S\I
}
,(17)
F ′+ :=
{
J ⊂ S | 1J 6 F
−(1J )
}
.(18)
Moreover, we shall denote by Φ′ and Φ′∗ the maps defined by (12) with F ′− and
F ′+ instead of F− and F+ respectively. Then, (Φ′,Φ′⋆) is also a Galois connection
between the lattices of subsets F ′− and F ′+.
Remark that from the definitions, F ′− and F ′+ and then (Φ′,Φ′⋆) only depend
on the support of the transition probability P, i.e. the set of elements (i, a, b, j) such
that i, j ∈ S, a ∈ Ai, b ∈ Bi, and (P
ab
i )j > 0. Furthermore, Lemma 5.1 shows that
under Assumption A, the former new sets and maps coincide with the corresponding
old ones.
Corollary 5.1. Given the payment-free Shapley operator F associated with actions
spaces Ai and Bi of the two players, and a transition probability P , the families F
+
and F−, as well as the Galois connection (Φ,Φ⋆), depend only on the support of
the transition probability P, when Assumption A holds.
Using Theorem 4.4 together with the previous result, we deduce the following
one.
Corollary 5.2. Given the payment-free Shapley operator F associated with actions
spaces Ai and Bi of the two players, and a transition probability P , such that As-
sumption A holds, the property “F has only trivial fixed points” depends only on
the support of the transition probability P.
The theorem below gives a way to compute the images of subsets of states by
the Galois connection.
Theorem 5.2. Let F be the payment-free Shapley operator associated with actions
spaces Ai and Bi of the two players, and a transition probability P , let F
+ and F−
be defined by (13) and (14) respectively. For I ∈ F ′− and J ∈ F ′+ we have
1Φ′(I) = (F
−)ω(1S\I) ,
1S\Φ′⋆(J) = (F
+)ω(1J) .
Proof. We show only the first assertion, the second follows by duality.
Let I ∈ F ′−. By definition, F+(1S\I) 6 1S\I , and using F
− 6 F+, we obtain
F−(1S\I) 6 1S\I . It follows that (F
−)ω(1S\I) is well defined and (F
−)ω(1S\I) 6
1S\I . F
− is a Boolean map, hence there exist L ⊂ S such that 1L = (F
−)ω(1S\I).
It remains to show that L = Φ′(I).
Since 1L is a fixed point of F
−, L belongs to F ′+. Furthermore, it satisfies
1L 6 1S\I , that is, I ∩ L = ∅. Then L ⊂ Φ
′(I).
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Let K ∈ F ′+ such that I ∩ K = ∅, that is, 1K 6 1S\I . By induction, we get
that (F−)k(1K) 6 (F
−)k(1S\I) for every integer k. By definition, we also have
that 1K 6 F
−(1K), hence (F
−)ω(1K) exists and (F
−)ω(1K) > 1K . This leads to
1K 6 (F
−)ω(1K) 6 (F
−)ω(1S\I) = 1L, which implies that K ⊂ L. This holds for
all K ∈ F ′+ such that I ∩K = ∅, hence, by definition of Φ′, Φ′(I) ⊂ L. 
We conclude this subsection by giving an interpretation in terms of zero-sum
game of the conditions (H1’) and (H2’) of Lemma 5.1.
Proposition 5.1. Let us fix a state space S = [n], and the actions spaces Ai and
Bi of the two players. Let r be a bounded transition payment, P be a transition
probability, and let T = T (r, P ) be the Shapley operator of the game Γ(r, P ). Then
(i) (H1’) holds for F = Tˆ and I ⊂ S if, and only if, there exists a policy for
player MIN, i.e. a map i ∈ S 7→ a ∈ Ai such that for any strategy of player
MAX and any initial state in I, the sequence of states of the game Γ(r, P )
stays in I almost surely;
(ii) (H2’) holds for F = Tˆ and J ⊂ S if, and only if, there exists a policy for
player MAX, i.e. a map (i, a) ∈ ∪i∈S({i}×Ai) 7→ b ∈ Bi such that for any
strategy of player MIN and any initial state in J , the sequence of states of
the game Γ(r, P ) stays in J almost surely.
Proof. (i): Suppose that (H1’) holds for F = Tˆ and I ⊂ S. Then, for all i ∈ I,
we have [F+(1S\I)]i = 0. Since F
+ involves min and max operators (see (13)),
we obtain that, for every i ∈ I, there is an action a ∈ Ai of player MIN such that
maxj:(Pab
i
)j>0[1S\I ]j = 0 for every action b ∈ Bi of playerMAX, which is equivalent,
by (15), with P abi 1S\I = 0. Since S is finite, there exists an element σ of A, that
is a policy σ of player MIN, σ : i ∈ S 7→ σ(i) ∈ Ai, such that P
σ(i)b
i 1S\I = 0 for all
i ∈ I and b ∈ Bi.
Denote, as in Section 2.1, by (ik)k>0 the (random) sequence of states of the game
Γ(r, P ). If the current state ik is in I, then the probability that the state ik+1 at
the following stage is in S \ I is equal to P abi 1S\I if actions a and b are chosen. In
particular, if player MIN selects the action σ(i), then this probability is 0, whatever
player MAX chooses. Hence, if player MIN chooses the Markovian stationary strat-
egy corresponding to σ (ak = σ(ik) for all k > 0), and if the initial state i0 is in I,
then for any strategy (Markovian or not) of player MAX, the probability that the
sequence of states (ik)k>0 leaves I is 0. This shows the “only if” part of (i).
Conversely, suppose that there exists a policy σ : i ∈ S 7→ σ(i) ∈ Ai of player
MIN such that for any initial state i0 in I, if player MIN chooses the Markovian
stationary strategy corresponding to σ, then (for any strategy of player MAX), the
state of the game Γ(r, P ) stays in I almost surely. In particular, for any i ∈ I and
any b ∈ Bi, taking i0 = i, the strategy ak = σ(ik), k > 0, for player MIN and
any strategy of player MAX such that b0 = b, we get that the probability that i1 is
outside I is equal to 0. Since this probability coincides with P
σ(i)b
i 1S\I , we deduce,
using (15), that max
j:(P
σ(i)b
i
)j>0
[1S\I ]j = 0. This holds for all b ∈ Bi and i ∈ I,
hence [F+(1S\I)]i 6 maxb∈Bi maxj:(Pσ(i)b
i
)j>0
[1S\I ]j = 0 for all i ∈ I. It follows
that F+(1S\I) 6 1S\I , that is (H1’).
(ii): Suppose that (H2’) holds for F = Tˆ and J ⊂ S. Then, for all i ∈ J , we have
[F−(1J)]i = 1. Since F
− involves min and max operators (see (14)), we obtain
that, for every i ∈ J and a ∈ Ai there is an action b ∈ Bi of player MAX such that
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minj:(Pab
i
)j>0[1J ]j = 1, which is equivalent, by (16), with P
ab
i 1J = 1. By the axiom
of choice, there exists a map τ : (i, a) ∈ ∪i∈S({i} × Ai) 7→ τ(i, a) ∈ Bi, that is a
policy of player MAX, such that P
aτ(i,a)
i 1J = 1 for all i ∈ J and a ∈ Ai.
By the same arguments as above, we get that for the game Γ(r, P ), if player
MAX chooses the Markovian stationary strategy corresponding to τ (bk = τ(ik, ak)
for all k > 0), and if the initial state i0 is in J , then for any strategy (Markovian
or not) of player MIN, the probability that the sequence of states (ik)k>0 leaves J
is 0. This shows the “only if” part of (ii). The “if” part is obtained by the same
arguments as for (i). 
5.2. Hypergraph characterization. In this subsection, we introduce directed
hypergraphs which will allow us to represent the Boolean operators F+ and F−. In
particular, we shall see that finding Φ′(I) (resp. Φ′⋆(J)) for a given I ∈ F ′− (resp.
J ∈ F ′+), is equivalent to solving a reachability problem in a directed hypergraph.
We refer the reader to [14, 5] for more background on reachability problems in
hypergraphs.
A directed hypergraph is a pair (N,E), where N is a set of nodes and E is a
set of (directed) hyperarcs. A hyperarc e is an ordered pair (t(e),h(e)) of disjoint
nonempty subsets of nodes; t(e) is the tail of e and h(e) is its head. We shall often
write t and h instead of t(e) and h(e), respectively, for brevity. When t and h are
both of cardinality one, the hyperarc is said to be an arc, and when every hyperarc
is an arc, the directed hypergraph becomes a directed graph.
In the following, the term hypergraph will always refer to a directed hypergraph.
The size of a hypergraph G = (N,E) is defined as size(G) = |N | +
∑
e∈E |t(e)| +
|h(e)|, where |X | denotes the cardinality of any set X . Note that we shall consider
in the sequel hypergraphs with an infinite number of nodes or hyperarcs, leading to
size(G) =∞ (we set |X | =∞ when X is infinite).
Let G = (N,E) be a hypergraph. A hyperpath of length p from a set of nodes
I ⊂ N to a node j ∈ N is a sequence of p hyperarcs (t1,h1), . . . , (tp,hp), such that
ti ⊂ ∪
i−1
k=0hk for all i = 1, . . . , p + 1 with the convention h0 = I and tp+1 = {j}.
Then, we say that a node j ∈ N is reachable from a set I ⊂ N , if and only if there
exists a hyperpath from I to j. Alternatively, the relation of reachability can be
defined in a recursive way: a node j is reachable from the set I if either j ∈ I or
there exists a hyperarc (t,h) such that j ∈ h and every node of t is reachable from
the set I. A set J is said to be reachable from a set I if every node of J is reachable
from I. We denote by Reach(I,G) the set of reachable nodes from I.
A subset I of N is invariant in the hypergraph G if it contains every node that
is reachable from itself, that is Reach(I,G) ⊂ I. If N ′ ⊂ N , we shall also say that a
subset I of N ′ is invariant in the hypergraph G relatively to N ′, if it contains every
node of N ′ that is reachable from itself, that is Reach(I,G) ∩N ′ ⊂ I. One readily
checks that the set of nodes of N ′ that are reachable from a given set I ⊂ N ′ is
the smallest invariant set in the hypergraph G relatively to N ′, containing I. The
reachability notion will be illustrated in Example 5.1.
We now make the connection with our problem. Let F be the payment-free Shap-
ley operator associated with the actions spaces Ai and Bi of the two players, and
the transition probability P , and let F+ and F− be its Boolean abstractions defined
by (13) and (14) respectively. We construct two hypergraphs G+ = (N+, E+) (Fig-
ure 1) and G− = (N−, E−) (Figure 3) as follows. We first need to introduce a copy
of S, denoted by S′. It is a set disjoint from S and given by a bijection π : S → S′.
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For the purposes of the following constructions, we also need to assume S′ disjoint
from the two sets {(i, a) | i ∈ S, a ∈ Ai} and {(i, a, b) | i ∈ S, a ∈ Ai, b ∈ Bi}.
The node set of G+ is N+ = {(i, a) | i ∈ S, a ∈ Ai} ∪ S ∪ S
′. The hyperarcs of
G+ are of the form:
- ({i} ×Ai, {π(i)}), i ∈ S;
- ({j}, {(i, a)}), for all j, i ∈ S and a ∈ Ai such that there exists b ∈ Bi with
(P abi )j > 0.
As shown on Figure 1, this hypergraph is structured in two layers; the first layer
consists of the arcs ({j}, {(i, a)}) whereas the second layer consists of the hyperarcs
({i} ×Ai, {π(i)}).
j
(i, a)
π(i)
S
{i} ×Ai
S′ = π(S)
Figure 1. Hypergraph G+ associated with F+
The motivation for the construction of this hypergraph is that it encodes the
Boolean operator F+. Recall that for x ∈ {0, 1}n, we have
[F+(x)]i = min
a∈Ai
max
b∈Bi
max
j:(Pab
i
)j>0
xj , i ∈ S .
Denoting by yi,a := maxb∈Bi maxj:(Pab
i
)j>0 xj , we also have [F
+(x)]i = mina∈Ai yi,a.
If x = 1J for some J ⊂ S, then yi,a = 1 if, and only if, there is b ∈ Bi and j ∈ J
such that (P abi )j > 0. This is also equivalent to the node (i, a) being reachable
from J in G+. Then, [F+(x)]i = 1 if, and only if, yi,a = 1 for every a ∈ Ai, which
is equivalent to all the nodes in the tail of the hyperarc ({i} × Ai, {π(i)}) being
reachable from J in G+. According to the recursive definition of reachability, this
is equivalent to π(i) being reachable from J in G+. Hence, we have the following
result.
Proposition 5.2. Let F be the payment-free Shapley operator associated with the
actions spaces Ai and Bi of the two players, and the transition probability P , and
let F+ be defined by (13). Then, the node π(i) ∈ S′ is reachable from J ⊂ S in G+
if, and only if, [F+(1J )]i = 1. 
Example 5.1. Let us consider the following payment-free Shapley operator defined
on R3:
F (x) =
(x1 ∨ x2) ∧ 12 (x1 + x3)x1 ∧ 12 (x2 + x3)
x2 ∨ x3

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where ∧ stands for min and ∨ for max. The Boolean operator F+ associated with
F is defined by
F+(x) =
(x1 ∨ x2) ∧ (x1 ∨ x3)x1 ∧ (x2 ∨ x3)
x2 ∨ x3
 .
Figure 2 shows the hypergraph G+ associated with F , where the element π(i) of S′
is denoted i′. It can be checked that the nodes 1′ and 3′ are reachable from {2, 3},
whereas the node 2′ is not. According to Proposition 5.2, this is equivalent to the
fact that
F+(1{2,3}) = 1{1,3} .
1
2
3
1’
2’
3’
Figure 2. The hypergraph G+ associated with F
The node set of G− is N− = {(i, a, b) | i ∈ S, a ∈ Ai, b ∈ Bi} ∪ S ∪ S
′, and its
hyperarcs are:
- ({(i, a)} ×Bi, {π(i)}), i ∈ S, a ∈ Ai;
- ({j}, {(i, a, b)}) for all j, i ∈ S, a ∈ Ai, b ∈ Bi, such that (P
ab
i )j > 0.
Again, G− consists of two layers (see Figure 3).
Like G+, the motivation for the construction of G− is the following result.
Proposition 5.3. Let F be the payment-free Shapley operator associated with the
actions spaces Ai and Bi of the two players, and the transition probability P , and
let F− be defined by (14). Then, the node π(i) ∈ S′ is reachable from I ⊂ S in G−
if, and only if, [F−(1S\I)]i = 0. 
So far we did not make any assumption about the action spaces, which may be
infinite, leading to infinite hypergraphs G+ and G−. The absence of symmetry
between G+ and G− reflects the lack of symmetry between F+ and F−.
Denote G¯+ and G¯− the hypergraphs obtained from G+ and G−, respectively,
by identifying every node i ∈ S with node π(i) ∈ S′. The following proposition is
immediate.
Proposition 5.4. A subset I ⊂ S belongs to F ′− if, and only if, its complement in S
is an invariant set in the hypergraph G¯+ relatively to S: Reach(S\I, G¯+)∩S = S\I.
A subset J ⊂ S belongs to F ′+ if, and only if, its complement in S is an invariant
set in the hypergraph G¯− relatively to S: Reach(S \ J, G¯−) ∩ S = S \ J . 
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j
(i, a, b′)
(i, a, b)
(i, a′, b)
(i, a′, b′)
π(i)
S
{(i, a)} ×Bi
{(i, a′)} ×Bi
S′ = π(S)
Figure 3. Hypergraph G− associated with F−
Corollary 5.3. Let F be the payment-free Shapley operator associated with the
actions spaces Ai and Bi of the two players, and the transition probability P , and
let F+ and F− be defined by (13) and (14) respectively. Let I ∈ F ′− and J ∈ F ′+.
Then Φ′(I) is given by the complement in S of all the nodes of S that are reachable
from I in G¯−. Moreover, Φ′⋆(J) is given by the complement in S of all the nodes
of S that are reachable from J in G¯+.
Proof. It follows readily from the definition of Φ′ (by (12) with F ′− and F ′+ instead
of F− and F+), that S \Φ′(I) is the smallest set I ′ containing I such that S \ I ′ ∈
F ′+. By Proposition 5.4, the latter condition holds if, and only if, I ′ satisfies
Reach(I ′, G¯−) ∩ S = I ′. Hence, Φ′(I) is the complement in S of the set of nodes of
S that are reachable from I in G¯−. The argument for Φ′⋆ is dual. 
We shall say that I, J ⊂ S are conjugate subsets of states with respect to the
hypergraphs G¯+, G¯− if I, J are nonempty and if
J = S \ (Reach(I, G¯−) ∩ S) and I = S \ (Reach(J, G¯+) ∩ S) .
Theorem 5.3. Let F be the payment-free Shapley operator associated with actions
spaces Ai and Bi of the two players, and a transition probability P , such that As-
sumption A holds. Then the following assertions are equivalent:
(i) F has a nontrivial fixed point;
(ii) there exist nonempty disjoint subsets I, J ⊂ S such that S \ I is invariant
in G¯+ relatively to S, and S \ J is invariant in G¯− relatively to S;
(iii) there exist conjugate subsets of states I, J ⊂ S with respect to the hyper-
graphs G¯+, G¯−.
Furthermore, for any sets I, J ⊂ S, they are conjugate with respect to the Galois
connection (Φ,Φ⋆) if, and only if, they are conjugate with respect to the hypergraphs
G¯+, G¯−.
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Proof. Recall that, under Assumption A, F ′−, F ′+, Φ′ and Φ′⋆ coincide with F−,
F+, Φ and Φ⋆ respectively. Then, the theorem follows from Theorem 4.4 and
from the characterization of the Galois connection (Φ′,Φ′∗) in terms of hypergraph
reachability given in Corollary 5.3. 
Remark 5.1. It is instructive to specialize the latter result to the case in which each
player has only one possible action in each state. Then, we can write F (x) = Px,
where P is a stochastic matrix. The two hypergraphs G¯+ and G¯− are isomorphic
(up to the identification of (i, a) and (i, a, b) with π(i)) to the transpose of the
digraph G associated to P (the arcs of G¯+ and G¯− are in the opposite direction).
In particular, S \ I is invariant in G¯+ (or G¯−) relatively to S if and only if there are
no arcs or paths from I to S \ I in G. Similarly, (I, J) is a pair of conjugate subsets
of states with respect to (G¯+, G¯−) if and only if J is the greatest set of nodes with
no paths in G to a node of I, and vice versa. So Assertion (ii) of Theorem 5.3
implies the existence of two distinct final classes in G: I and J are disjoint and
there are no arcs from I to S \ I, and similarly there are no arcs from J to S \J , so
there exists a final class of G included in I and also a final class of G included in J ,
and since I and J are disjoint, there are two distinct final classes of G. Moreover, if
I and J are two distinct final classes, then there are no arcs or paths from I to S \ I
in G. The same is true for J so that Assertion (ii) of Theorem 5.3 holds. Hence
in the present case, Assertion (ii) of Theorem 5.3 corresponds to the condition that
the digraph associated to P has two distinct final classes, that is the opposite of
Assertion (iv) in Theorem 1.1.
6. Algorithmic issues
Let us fix a state space S = [n], and the nonempty finite actions spaces Ai and
Bi of the two players. We denote by m1 the number of couples (i, a) with i ∈ S
and a ∈ Ai, and by m2 the number of triples (i, a, b) with i ∈ S, a ∈ Ai and b ∈ Bi.
Then n 6 m1 6 nm and m1 6 m2 6 nm
2 where m is the greatest cardinality
of Ai and Bi, i ∈ S, and we have m1 6 size(G
+) = O(nm1) 6 O(n
2m) and
m2 6 size(G
−) = O(nm2) 6 O(n
2m2).
6.1. Checking ergodicity. From Theorem 3.1, the negation of the following prob-
lem is equivalent to the next one.
Problem (NonTrivialFP). Does a given payment-free Shapley operator F : Rn →
Rn with finite action spaces have a non trivial fixed point, that is, does there exist
u ∈ Rn \ R1 such that u = F (u)?
Problem (Ergodicity). Is a given game Γ(r, P ) with finite action spaces and
bounded payment r ergodic?
It is known that in a directed hypergraph G, the set of reachable nodes from a set
I can be computed in O(size(G)) time [14]. Hence, the following result follows from
Proposition 5.4 and Corollary 5.3 and the property that, when the actions spaces
are finite, F ′−, F ′+, Φ′ and Φ′⋆ coincide with F−, F+, Φ and Φ⋆ respectively.
Proposition 6.1. Let us fix a state space S = [n], and the nonempty finite actions
spaces Ai and Bi of the two players. For any payment-free Shapley operator F ,
and any I, J ⊂ S, checking that I ∈ F− and J ∈ F+ can be done respectively in
O(nm1) 6 O(n
2m) and O(nm2) 6 O(n
2m2) time. Moreover, for any I ∈ F− and
J ∈ F+, Φ(I) and Φ⋆(J) can be evaluated respectively in O(nm2) 6 O(n
2m2) and
O(nm1) 6 O(n
2m) time.
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Using Proposition 6.1 and Theorem 5.3, we obtain the following result, which
shows that checking the ergodicity of a game is fixed parameter tractable: if the
dimension is fixed, we can solve it in a time which is polynomial in the input-
size. Thus, for instances of moderate dimension, but with large action spaces, the
ergodicity condition can be checked efficiently.
Theorem 6.1. Let us fix a state space S = [n], and the nonempty finite actions
spaces Ai and Bi of the two players. Let r be a bounded transition payment and P
be a transition probability. Then, the ergodicity of Γ(r, P ), that is the property “Tˆ
has only trivial fixed points”, can be checked in O(2nnm2) 6 O(2
nn2m2) time.
Problem NonTrivialFP has already been addressed in the deterministic case
with finite action spaces by Yang an Zhao [31]. Suppose indeed that in the expres-
sion (7), the support of each transition probability is concentrated on just one state
and consider the restriction of such an operator to the Boolean vectors {0, 1}n. We
obtain a monotone Boolean operator.
Recall that a Boolean operator, defined on Boolean vectors {0, 1}n, is expressed
using the logical operators AND, OR and NOT. Monotone Boolean operators are
those whose expression involves only AND and OR operators. These can be in-
terpreted as min and max operators, respectively. So, deterministic payment-free
Shapley operators are equivalent to monotone Boolean operators and ProblemNon-
TrivialFP can be expressed in a simpler form.
Problem (MonBool). Does a given monotone Boolean operator have a nontrivial
fixed point, that is, different from the zero vector and the unit vector?
Theorem 6.2 (Yang, Zhao [31]). Problem MonBool is NP-complete.
Using this result and the characterizations of the previous section, we obtain:
Corollary 6.1. Problem NonTrivialFP is NP-complete.
Proof. As a direct consequence of Theorem 6.2, we get that Problem NonTriv-
ialFP is NP-hard. We now show that it is in NP. Suppose that a payment-free
Shapley operator F has a nontrivial fixed point u. Then argminu and argmaxu
are proper subsets of states, and by Lemma 4.2, argminu ∈ F− and Φ(argminu) ⊃
argmaxu 6= ∅. Hence, argminu ∈ F− is a proper subset of states such that
Φ(argmin u) is nonempty, and we know by Theorem 4.4 that these conditions are
sufficient to guarantee the existence of a nontrivial fixed point. Furthermore, these
conditions can be checked in polynomial time (this is a consequence of Proposi-
tion 6.1). Hence, argminu is a short certificate to Problem NonTrivialFP. 
6.2. Problem I=Min. A way to analyze Problem NonTrivialFP would be to
characterize the fixed point set W := {w ∈ Rn | F (w) = w} of a payment-free
Shapley operator F . This problem also arises in several other situations. First in
Proposition 3.2, we have shown that W is exactly the set of possible mean payoff
vectors of the game Γ(r, P ) when the transition payment r varies. Next, in [11],
Everett introduced the notion of recursive games which are modified versions of
the game Γ(0, P ) in which payments occur in some absorbing states. These games
are well posed if there exists a unique element of W with prescribed values in the
absorbing states. Finally, W allows one to determine the set E of solutions u of
the ergodic equation T (u) = λ1 + u. Indeed, it is shown in [2] that if the Shapley
operator T is piecewise affine, if u is any point in E , and if V is a neighborhood
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of 0, then, E ∩ (u + V) = u + {w ∈ V | F (w) = w} = u + (V ∩ W), where F is a
payment-free Shapley operator (the semidifferential of T at point u). Hence, the
local study of the ergodic equation reduces to the characterization of the fixed point
set W .
In an attempt to understand the structure of the set of fixed points of a payment-
free Shapley operator, we shall consider the following simpler problem.
Problem (I=Min). Let I be a subset of S. Does a given payment-free Shapley
operator with finite action spaces have a fixed point u satisfying I = argminu?
We know from Lemma 4.2 that a necessary condition is I ∈ F−. Under As-
sumption A (which is the case if action spaces are finite), this is equivalent to
F+(1S\I) 6 1S\I . In fact, there is a stronger necessary condition.
Lemma 6.3. Let F be the payment-free Shapley operator associated with actions
spaces Ai and Bi of the two players, and a transition probability P , such that As-
sumption A holds and let I ⊂ S. Suppose that F has a fixed point u verifying
argminu = I. Then, F+(1S\I) = 1S\I .
Proof. If I = S, the conclusion of the lemma is trivial. Assume I 6= S and let u
be a fixed point of F verifying argminu = I. We may suppose that mini∈S ui = 0
and maxi∈S ui = 1, so that u 6 1S\I . Since F 6 F
+, we get u = F (u) 6
F+(u) 6 F+(1S\I). The last vector is Boolean, so this inequality implies 1S\I 6
F+(1S\I). Moreover, according to Lemma 4.2 and Lemma 5.1, we already know
that F+(1S\I) 6 1S\I . Hence the result. 
We continue with another necessary condition.
Lemma 6.4. Let F be the payment-free Shapley operator associated with actions
spaces Ai and Bi of the two players, and a transition probability P , and let I ∈ F
−.
If Φ(I) = ∅, then F has no nontrivial fixed point u satisfying I ⊂ argminu.
Proof. Suppose on the contrary that there is a nontrivial fixed point u such that
I ⊂ argmin u. Let I ′ = argminu and J := argmaxu. We know from Lemma 4.2
that I ′ ∈ F−, J ∈ F+ and that J ⊂ Φ(I ′). Since I ⊂ I ′, we have Φ(I ′) ⊂ Φ(I).
Hence J ⊂ Φ(I), and since J 6= ∅, we get a contradiction. 
If I = ∅, the answer to Problem I=Min is trivially negative, and if I = S it is
trivially positive. Assume now that I is a proper subset of S. The above results
show that a necessary condition to have a positive answer to problem I=Min is
that I ∈ F− and Φ(I) 6= ∅. Moreover, by Lemma 4.3, a sufficient condition to have
a positive answer to problem I=Min is that I is closed with respect to the Galois
connection (Φ,Φ⋆).
It remains to examine the case in which I ∈ F− is proper, with Φ(I) 6= ∅ and
I 6= I¯, where for I ∈ F−, I¯ := Φ⋆(Φ(I)) denotes the closure of I with respect to the
Galois connection (Φ,Φ⋆) (likewise, for J ∈ F+, J¯ is the closure of J with respect
to the Galois connection (Φ⋆,Φ)). This implies in particular that I¯ 6= S (otherwise
we would have Φ(I) = Φ(I¯) = ∅).
Assume that Assumption A holds. We define a reduced operator F△ : RI¯ → RI¯
as follows. According to the game-theoretic interpretation (Proposition 5.1), we
know that player MIN can force the state of the game Γ(0, P ) (which has F as
Shapley operator) to stay in I¯. Hence, we consider the actions of player MIN that
achieve this goal: for every i ∈ I¯, let
A△i := {a ∈ Ai | ∀b ∈ Bi and j ∈ S \ I¯ , (P
ab
i )j = 0} .
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These sets are nonempty, since I¯ ∈ F− = F ′−. Another formulation of A△i is the
following:
A△i := {a ∈ Ai | max
b∈Bi
P abi 1S\I¯ = [F (1S\I¯)]i = 0} .
For x ∈ Rn and K ⊂ S, we denote by xK the restriction of x to R
K . We apply the
same notation to elements of ∆(S). Then, for every i ∈ I¯, let
[F△(x)]i := min
a∈A△
i
max
b∈Bi
(P abi )I¯ x, x ∈ R
I¯ .
From the definition of A△i , we have that (P
ab
i )I¯ ∈ ∆(I¯) for all i ∈ I¯, a ∈ A
△
i and
b ∈ Bi. Hence, F
△ is a payment-free Shapley operator over I¯, with actions spaces
A△i and Bi and transition probability P
△ : (i, a, b) 7→ (P abi )I¯ . Moreover, we have
(19) [F△(xI¯)]i = min
a∈A△
i
max
b∈Bi
P abi x, i ∈ I¯ , x ∈ R
n .
Theorem 6.5. Let F be the payment-free Shapley operator associated with finite
actions spaces Ai and Bi of the two players, and a transition probability P . Let
I ∈ F− be proper, such that Φ(I) 6= ∅ and I 6= I¯. Then F has a fixed point whose
argmin is I if, and only if, the same holds for the reduced operator F△.
Proof. We first show the “only if” part of the theorem. Let u be a fixed point of F
such that I = argminu. Recall that I 6= S by hypothesis. So we may suppose that
maxi∈S ui = 1 and mini∈S ui = 0.
It follows from (19) that [F (u)]I¯ 6 F
△(uI¯). Hence uI¯ = [F (u)]I¯ 6 F
△(uI¯), so
that (F△)ω(uI¯) exists. Let us denote it by v. It is a fixed point of F
△ and it satisfies
uI¯ 6 v. As a consequence, vi > 0 for every i ∈ I¯ \ I.
Furthermore, Lemma 4.1 implies that I ∈ F−, meaning that F (1S\I) 6 1S\I .
Then, for all i ∈ I, there exists a ∈ Ai such that for all b ∈ Bi, P
ab
i 1S\I = 0. Since
I ⊂ I¯, this implies that (P abi )j = 0 for all j ∈ S\I¯, and since this holds for all b ∈ Bi,
we deduce that a ∈ A△i , by definition. Hence, mina∈A△i maxb∈Bi P
ab
i 1S\I = 0, and
using (19), we deduce that F△(1I¯\I) = 0 for all i ∈ I. Therefore F
△(1I¯\I) 6 1I¯\I ,
which means that I still satisfies condition (H1) with the operator F△. Since uI¯ 6
1I¯\I , it follows that v = (F
△)ω(uI¯) 6 (F
△)ω(1I¯\I) 6 1I¯\I . Hence vi = 0 for every
i ∈ I, which shows that argmin v = I.
We now prove the “if” part of the theorem. Assume that F△ has a fixed point v
such that argmin v = I. We may suppose that maxi∈S vi = 1 and mini∈S vi = 0.
Let w = Fω(1S\I¯). We know from Lemma 4.3 that w is a fixed point of F such
that argminw = I¯. Thus, it satisfies wI¯ = 0 and ws > 0 for every s ∈ S \ I¯, hence
w > α1S\I¯ for some α > 0.
We next use the notions of semidifferentiability and semiderivative, referring the
reader to [26, 2] for the definition of these notions and for their basic properties.
Since the action spaces are finite, F is piecewise affine and so it is semidifferen-
tiable at point w. Furthermore, denoting F ′w its semiderivative at w, there is a
neighborhood V of 0 such that
(20) F (w + x) = F (w) + F ′w(x), ∀x ∈ V .
We next give a formula for F ′w. For every i ∈ S, let
Ai(w) :=
{
a ∈ Ai | max
b∈Bi
P abi w = [F (w)]i
}
and for a ∈ Ai(w), let
Bai (w) :=
{
b ∈ Bi | P
ab
i w = [F (w)]i
}
.
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Then we have, for every x ∈ Rn and every i ∈ S,[
F ′w(x)
]
i
= min
a∈Ai(w)
max
b∈Ba
i
(w)
P abi x .
Observe that for i ∈ I¯, we have Ai(w) = A
△
i and B
a
i (w) = Bi, for every a ∈
Ai(w). This is because [F (w)]i = wi = 0 and α1S\I¯ 6 w 6 1S\I¯ , then a ∈ Ai(w) if
and only if maxb∈Bi P
ab
i 1S\I¯ = 0 and b ∈ B
a
i (w) if and only if P
ab
i 1S\I¯ = 0. Then,
using (19), we obtain [F ′w(x)]I¯ = F
△(xI¯) for every x ∈ R
n.
We introduce now the vector z ∈ [0, 1]n given by zI¯ = v and zS\I¯ = 0. By the
above property of F ′w, we get that [F
′
w(z)]I¯ = F
△(v) = v = zI¯ . Moreover, since F
′
w
is a payment-free operator, and z > 0, we get that F ′w(z) > 0, so F
′
w(z) > z. Hence,
z¯ = (F ′w)
ω(z) exists and is a fixed point of F ′w, belonging to [0, 1]
n. Again by the
above property of F ′w , we get that [(F
′
w)
k(z)]I¯ = F
△([(F ′w)
k−1(z)]I¯) for all k > 1,
so that by induction [(F ′w)
k(z)]I¯ = v, and z¯I¯ = v.
Choose ε > 0 small enough so that εz¯ is in V and let u = w+ε z¯. Then, from (20),
we get that F (u) = F (w) + εF ′w(z¯) = w + εz¯ = u, where we used the fact that F
′
w
is positively homogeneous. Then u is a fixed point of F . Moreover, by construction
u = w + ε z¯ > w and u > ǫz¯, and since argminw = I¯ and argmin z¯ ∩ I¯ = I, we
deduce that uI = 0 and us > 0 for every s ∈ S \ I, that is argminu = I. 
The previous result together with the observations made before lead to Algo-
rithm 1 below, which solves Problem I=Min, as detailed in Theorem 6.6. There,
we are still assuming that for each state i ∈ S the action spaces Ai and Bi are finite.
Moreover, if F is a payment-free Shapley operator, we write (ΦF ,Φ
⋆
F ) the Galois
connection associated to that operator.
Algorithm 1
Require: S, Ai, Bi, P , the corresponding payment-free Shapley operator F : R
S →
RS and I ⊂ S
Ensure: answer to Problem I=Min
1: if I = ∅ then
2: return false
3: else if I = S then
4: return true
5: else
6: loop
7: if F+(1S\I) 6= 1S\I or ΦF (I) = ∅ then
8: return false
9: else if Φ⋆F (ΦF (I)) = I then
10: return true
11: else
12: Ai ← A
△
i , P ← P
△, F ← F△, S ← Φ⋆F (ΦF (I))
13: end if
14: end loop
15: end if
Theorem 6.6. Algorithm 1 solves Problem I=Min in O(n2m2) 6 O(n
3m2) time.
Proof. The fact that Algorithm 1 provides the right answer is a direct consequence
of Lemma 6.3, Lemma 6.4, Lemma 4.3 and Theorem 6.5.
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We next show that it stops after at most n iterations of the loop. Suppose that
during the execution of a loop, the first two conditions (which are stopping criteria)
are not satisfied. Then the closure of I with respect to the Galois connection
(ΦF ,Φ
⋆
F ) associated with F is a proper subset of states. Hence, the cardinality of
the state space for the reduced operator F△ is strictly less than the one of F .
Moreover, each operation in the loop requires at most O(nm2) 6 O(n
2m2) time
(see Proposition 6.1). 
6.3. Mixed problem. So far, we have only considered the problem with a single
constraint on the fixed point, concerning the indices of the minimal entries. The
dual problem, concerning the maximal entries of fixed points, is equivalent. We
address now a mixed-condition problem.
Problem (IMinJMax). Let I and J be nonempty disjoint subsets of S. Does a
given payment-free Shapley operator with finite action spaces have a fixed point u
satisfying I = argminu and J = argmaxu?
Let F be a payment-free Shapley operator with finite action spaces and let I, J
be two nonempty disjoint subsets of S. We already know from Lemma 6.3 and its
dual formulation that F+(1S\I) = 1S\I and F
−(1J) = 1J are necessary conditions
to have a positive answer to problem IMinJMax. The following theorem shows
that the two constraints can be treated separately.
Theorem 6.7. Let F be the payment-free Shapley operator associated with actions
spaces Ai and Bi of the two players, and a transition probability P . Let I ∈ F
− and
J ∈ F+ be two nonempty disjoint subsets. Then F has a fixed point u satisfying
I = argminu and J = argmaxu if and only if F has fixed points v, w satisfying
argmin v = I and argmaxw = J .
Proof. We only need to prove the “if” part of the theorem. Suppose that F has
fixed points v, w satisfying argmin v = I and argmaxw = J . Then, we may impose
mini∈S vi = 0, maxi∈S vi = mini∈S wi = 1/2 and maxi∈S wi = 1.
Let L = {z ∈ Rn | v ∨ 1J 6 z 6 w ∧ 1S\I}. Put in words, L is the set of all
elements in [0, 1]n whose entries are 0 on I, 1 on J and comprised between those
of v and w elsewhere. In particular, the entries outside I or J of the elements in L
are in (0, 1).
The set L is a complete lattice. Since J ∈ F+, we have v∨1J 6 F (v)∨F (1J ) 6
F (v∨1J ). Since I ∈ F
−, we have w∧1S\I > F (w)∧F (1S\I ) > F (w∧1S\I). Hence,
v∨1J 6 z 6 w∧1S\I implies v∨1J 6 F (v∨1J ) 6 F (z) 6 F (w∧1S\I) 6 w∧1S\I ,
which shows that L is invariant by F . As F is order-preserving, Tarski’s fixed point
theorem guarantees the existence of a fixed point of F in L. 
Corollary 6.2. Problem IMinJMax can be solved in O(n2m2) 6 O(n
3m2) time.
Proof. According to Theorem 6.7, Problem IMinJMax can be solved by two in-
stances of Problem I=Min, one with inputs F and I, one with inputs F˜ and J . 
6.4. Summary of complexity results. The following table summarizes the re-
sults of this section.
Problem Complexity class
MonBool NP-complete ([31])
NonTrivialFP NP-complete (Corollary 6.1)
I=Min P (Theorem 6.6)
IMinJMax P (Corollary 6.2)
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7. Example
7.1. Checking ergodicity. We consider the game with perfect information defined
by the graph represented in Figure 4. There are four states represented by gray
nodes. A token is initially placed in one of these nodes. At each stage, the token is
moved along the edges of the graph until it reaches another state, according to the
following rule: player MIN moves the token at circle nodes, player MAX at square
ones and at the diamond nodes, an edge is selected at random according to the
probabilities indicated on the edges starting from the node. A payment occurs only
for the edges starting from a MAX node (its value is given by the label attached to
such edges).
1
1/
2
1
−2
−1
2
1/2
2 2
1/2
−3
3
1/2
2
1/2
4
−2
1/
2
1/2 1/2
−1
Figure 4.
The Shapley operator of this game is
T (x) =

2 + x1 ∧ 1 +
1
2 (x1 + x2)(
−2 + 12 (x1 + x2) ∨ −1 + x1
)
∧ 2 + 12 (x1 + x3)
−3 + 12 (x1 + x3) ∨ −1 +
1
2 (x2 + x4)
−2 + x4 ∨ 2 +
1
2 (x3 + x4)
 .
It can be shown that T verifies the ergodic equation (8) with ergodic constant
λ = 1/3 and u = (4/3, 0, 2/3, 4)T. Let us check whether this game is ergodic, or
equivalently, whether the recession function of T , denoted by F and given by
(21) F (x) =

x1 ∧
1
2 (x1 + x2)(
1
2 (x1 + x2) ∨ x1
)
∧ 12 (x1 + x3)
1
2 (x1 + x3) ∨
1
2 (x2 + x4)
x4 ∨
1
2 (x3 + x4)
 ,
has only trivial fixed points.
To answer these questions, we need to construct the Galois connection induced
by the game. Firstly, we check that
F− =
{
∅, {1}, {1, 2}, {1, 2, 3, 4}
}
,
F+ =
{
∅, {4}, {1, 2, 3, 4}
}
.
This can be seen on the graph represented in Figure 4. Indeed, following the game-
theoretic interpretation (Proposition 5.1), we observe that player MIN can always
make sure that the state remains in {1} or in {1, 2}, and that player MAX can
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always make sure that it stays in {4}. Alternatively, we can construct the Boolean
abstractions of F , namely
F+(x) =

x1
x1 ∨ (x2 ∧ x3)
x1 ∨ x3 ∨ x2 ∨ x4
x3 ∨ x4
 and F−(x) =

x1 ∧ x2
x1 ∧ x3
(x1 ∧ x3) ∨ (x2 ∧ x4)
x4
 ,
and check that
F+(1{2,3,4}) 6 1{2,3,4}, F
+(1{3,4}) 6 1{3,4} and F
−(1{4}) > 1{4} .
By definition of the Galois connection, or using its characterization by the Boolean
operators, we get that
Φ({1}) = Φ({1, 2}) = {4} ,
Φ⋆({4}) = {1, 2} .
We can thus conclude by Theorem 4.4 and Theorem 3.1 that the game is not
ergodic.
7.2. Finding a fixed point with prescribed argmin. We now address the prob-
lem of finding fixed points of F with fixed argmin. Since 1{2,3,4} and 1{3,4} are the
only nontrivial fixed points of F+, we know from Lemma 6.3 that {1} and {1, 2}
are the only possible candidates for nontrivial argmin.
The set {1, 2} is closed with respect to the Galois connection. Thus, according
to Lemma 4.3, F has a fixed point whose argmin is {1, 2}. Moreover, its argmax
can only be {4}. We can check that the vector (0, 0, 1/2, 1)T is a fixed point with
these properties.
As for the set {1}, we cannot conclude directly from Lemma 6.4 or Lemma 4.3.
According to Theorem 6.5, we need to construct a reduced operator, F△, defined
on R{1,2} ({1, 2} being the closure of {1}):
F△(x) =
(
x1 ∧
1
2 (x1 + x2)
x1 ∨
1
2 (x1 + x2)
)
.
The directed graph associated with this operator is represented in Figure 5.
1
1/
2
2
1/2
Figure 5.
We check that for this reduced operator we have
F− =
{
∅, {1}, {1, 2}
}
,
F+ =
{
∅, {1, 2}
}
.
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Hence, Φ({1}) = ∅ and by Lemma 6.4, we know that F△ has no fixed point whose
argmin is {1}. According to Theorem 6.5, the same holds for F .
We conclude that any nontrivial fixed point u of F verifies u1 = u2 < u3 < u4.
Furthermore, from (21) we readily get that u3 =
1
2 (u2 + u4). These conditions are
also sufficient for a point to be a nontrivial fixed point of F . As a consequence,
assuming that in Figure 4 the value of the payments can change, all the realizable
mean payoff vectors χ are characterized by
χ1 = χ2 6 χ4, χ3 =
1
2
(χ1 + χ4) .
8. Summary and discussion of the main results
It is convenient to give here a synthetic description of our results. We use the
notations and definitions of the previous sections, in particular the definition of the
Galois connection and of the hypergraph given in Section 4 and 5 respectively, and
and the definition of Assumption A given in Section 5. Combining Theorems 3.1,
4.4 and 5.3, and Corollary 5.2, we obtain the following result, which shows that most
of the classical characterizations of ergodicity for finite state Markov chains, listed
in Theorem 1.1, carry over to the two-player case, up to the essential discrepancy
that the directed graph of the transition probability matrix is now replaced by a
pair of directed hypergraphs depending on the transition probability.
Theorem 8.1 (Ergodicity of zero-sum games). Let us fix a state space S = [n],
and the nonempty actions spaces Ai and Bi of the two players. Let r be a bounded
transition payment, let P be a transition probability, and let T = T (r, P ) be the
Shapley operator of the game Γ(r, P ). Then, the following properties are equivalent:
(i) the recession function T̂ = T (0, P ) has only trivial fixed points;
(ii) the mean payoff vector of the game Γ(r + g, P ) does exist and is constant
for all additive perturbations g of the transition payment, depending only
of the state (so ga,bi = gi, for all i ∈ S, a ∈ Ai and b ∈ Bi);
(iii) the ergodic equation g + T (u) = λ1+ u is solvable for all vectors g ∈ Rn;
(iv) there does not exist a pair of conjugate subsets of states with respect to
the Galois connection (Φ,Φ⋆) associated with the recession function T̂ =
T (0, P ).
Assume in addition that Assumption A holds. Then, the preceding conditions are
equivalent to the following one:
(v) there does not exist a pair of conjugate subsets of states with respect to the
hypergraphs (G¯+, G¯−) associated with the transition probability P .
In particular (still making Assumption A), the ergodicity property of a game Γ(r, P )
only depends on the support of P .
The classical theory of additive functionals of the trajectory of Markov chains
corresponds to the zero-player case of zero-sum game theory, or equivalently to the
case where each player has only one possible action in each state. By applying the
above theorem to the degenerate Shapley operator
T (x) = g + Px
with recession function
Tˆ (x) = Px ,
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the characterizations (i)–(iv) of the ergodicity of a Markov chain with transition
probability matrix P , listed in Theorem 1.1, are readily recovered, see in particular
Remark 5.1 for the characterization (iv) (we exclude the characterization of Point (v)
of Theorem 1.1, in terms of the uniqueness of the invariant measure, which has no
nonlinear analogue).
When the action spaces are finite, an algorithmic issue is to check ergodicity. We
noted that a result of Yang and Zhao [31] implies that checking the non-ergodicity
is NP-hard, and proved that this problem is NP-complete (Corollary 6.1) but fixed
parameter tractable (Theorem 6.1).
As a refinement of the present ergodicity results we have considered the problem
of characterizing the fixed point set W := {w ∈ Rn | F (w) = w} of a payment-
free Shapley operator F . This problem has been well studied in the one-player
case. In particular, when the action spaces are finite, W is known to be sup-norm
isometric to a polyhedral cone with a well characterized dimension [1]. In the two-
player case, the properties of the fixed point set W are less understood. In order
to get information on this set, we have considered in particular the problem of the
existence of a fixed point w of F such that wi is minimal precisely when i belongs
to a prescribed subset I ⊂ S. We showed in Theorem 6.6 that this problem can
be solved in polynomial time, by Algorithm 1. We also showed that we can check
whether F has a fixed point with prescribed argmin and argmax in polynomial time.
Such results deal with the “order abstraction” of the fixed point set of F . A
natural refinement would be to ask whether, for a given partition I1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ik of
the state space S, there is a fixed point w of F such that
wi = wj , ∀i, j ∈ Im, ∀m ∈ [k], and wi1 < wi2 < · · · < wik , ∀i1 ∈ I1, . . . , ik ∈ Ik .
We do not know whether this can be checked in polynomial time for any k > 3.
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